

CHAPTER 16

The Social Costs of the Gig Economy and Institutional Responses: Forms of Institutional Bricolage in Italy, France and the Netherlands

Maurizio Franzini and Silvia Lucciarini

Introduction

Innovations certainly produce benefits, but they also come with social costs that impact in several areas. This is particularly evident in relation to work, where innovation modifies features such as volume, wages and quality (Kalleberg 2011). The extent, scope and duration of these costs are highly dependent on economic institutions and their relationship with policies (Davidson and Potts 2016). Indeed, states have, previously, been able to limit these negative social repercussions on labour through institutional evolution; in particular, the collective actions of intermediate bodies (Hall and Soskice 2001) have enhanced social cohesion and reduced inequalities. This is one crucial reason why capitalist systems have been able to reproduce themselves and persist over time, even in the face of changing socio-economic and institutional contexts (Streeck 2011; Crouch 1999; Peck and Theodore 2007; Calhoun et al. 2013). It

How to cite this book chapter:

Franzini, M. and Lucciarini, S. 2022. The Social Costs of the Gig Economy and Institutional Responses: Forms of Institutional Bricolage in Italy, France and the Netherlands. In: Armano, E., Briziarelli, M., and Risi, E. (eds.), *Digital Platforms and Algorithmic Subjectivities*. Pp. 225–237. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.16997/book54.q>. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0

thus makes sense to ask three questions among others: *what are the social costs of today's wave of 'digital' innovation? How is the institutional context evolving? Is that evolution sufficient to curb such costs or are further structural changes needed?*

Given the increasing diversification of the labour force, part of this debate has focused specifically on aspects of the status of workers, in particular how to ensure non-standard workers are able to access existing social protections, and how to develop new standards to recognise digital skills that can enhance workers' position in the labour market (Iversen and Soskice 2019). With the current boom in freelance work in all its various forms, scholars are called on to investigate not only transformations in organisational structures but also systems of both collective representation and action (Grimshaw 2016). Some studies have focused on national regulatory systems and on the channels of representation offered by both formal entities and informal collective actors (Vandaele 2018) to the 'digital' self-employed, or 'new self-employed', as some scholars have termed them (Daskalova 2018).

Our main concern is whether institutions have changed in a way that would enable the reduction of the burden of socio-economic costs of these 'digital innovations' and, if so, what these changes should be. Historically, trade unions have been the main actor working to defend and extend workers' rights and to protect and improve working conditions. Several other quasi-collective (Ostrom 1990) actors have emerged as self-employed workers increased in number, but these are not always coordinated with unions, particularly in the field of social and mutual aid cooperatives and of professional associations (Bellini and Lucciarini 2019). These emerging actors make the overall landscape of workers' identity and representation much more complex. To date, scholars have studied these new organisations for self-employed (SE hereafter) workers predominantly by framing them as external to the traditional system of industrial relations, or as bottom-up initiatives with limited powers of action (Vandaele 2018).

In this chapter, which is based on fieldwork with gig workers conducted in three countries, we argue that the role of the state, which has been crucial in the 'classic' system of industrial relations, should also be considered and analysed in relation to today's new organisations for SE workers. In particular, since we focus on mutualistic cooperatives (MCs, hereafter)¹ in Italy, the Netherlands and France we devote particular attention to the role that the state can and does perform in moulding the activities of MCs, as clearly illustrated by our comparative empirical analysis. Members of these MCs are mainly gig workers (in particular on and off-platform, see OECD 2019), a population that has come to face specific risks due to emerging new technologies, such as precarization and instability (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011). Evidence from the fieldwork also shows that responses to this challenge have the character of 'institutional bricolage' (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Carstensen 2015; 2017). Old and new institutional actors perform new functions to adapt

configurations of rules and practices to respond to new conditions and increasing uncertainty. Actors innovate, reworking the existing institutional arrangements, within their limited cognitive and social resources, and as far as they perceive their actions as legitimate (Cleaver and de Konning 2015), in a gradual institutional change trajectory, where bricolage strategies could represent the first step (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Also in this perspective, the role of the state can be of paramount importance.

The Gig Economy and the Self-Employed: Towards Experimental Forms of Representation and Protection

The term gig economy essentially refers to a labour market characterised by short term, 'on-demand' jobs and/or by the practice of dividing work into tasks, each of which is carried out autonomously and often without knowing what the final output of the production process will be, all in the context of an ever-increasing fragmentation of working conditions (ILO 2015). The gig economy includes both traditional jobs (messenger, porter, gardener, etc.) and new jobs stemming from today's broader processes of digitisation, carried out mainly by SE workers and almost always through the intermediation of platforms (European Commission 2018).

Both atypical and solo-SE workers were already on the rise; however, due to their wide-ranging effects, platforms have contributed greatly to fuelling this trend (Eurofound 2017a; 2017b). Moreover, the labour market position of SE workers is intensely bifurcated, with yawning gaps not only between skilled and unskilled workers but also among professional categories, which are themselves characterised by high variability (Gallie 2013). It is becoming clear, however, that old institutions and policies (including welfare) are not capable of counteracting and limiting the socio-economic costs that gig workers may end up facing as a result of innovation.

In this respect the first consideration is that the main actors historically engaged in protecting workers' rights – trade unions – have faced difficulties for some time now. The second consideration, in terms of institutional effectiveness or lack thereof, is linked more specifically with regulatory models and forms of social protection. Many European countries have responded to the growth of self-employment by extending measures to regulate this field, proceeding along a path of progressive hybridisation between subordinate and autonomous work. In particular, some protection schemes that once applied only to employees have been extended to SE workers (Eurofound 2017a). This phenomenon has occurred in many European countries, but policies have not converged towards a single model; in fact, differences between countries have remained quite significant, each one shaped by different historical trajectories (Pernicka 2006). In general, the regulatory system for SE workers is deeply flawed (Conen and Schippers 2020), in particular in terms of the safeguards it

provides. These safeguards do not protect SE workers from fluctuating market trends and, broadly, operate in ways that makes workers themselves responsible for facing the different risks that they may encounter throughout the life cycle, risks which had previously been socialised in various ways. In particular, SE workers are forced to continuously ‘transition’ between jobs and clients and must be particularly ‘adaptive’ because platforms’ organisational systems are based on changing structures and rules as well as frequent innovations. If not curbed, this complexity calls for a system of safeguards that is not easy to implement and certainly has not yet been put in place. In addressing this phenomenon, Grimshaw et al. (2016) suggest that SE workers face ‘protection gaps’, particularly if their jobs are intermittent, or they work in sectors affected by frequent waves of innovation, even if solely at the level of organisation. Yet even in this outdated context we can begin to see signs of institutional change, both technological and organisational.

While it is true that labour fragmentation and the de-standardisation of workers (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2017) have undermined the associative capacity of collective actors and weakened collective action, it is also true that new forms of intervention and collective action can still develop. In fact, these drives towards de-collectivisation have actually led to a reconsideration of collective actors, formal and informal, and their capacity to represent workers’ interests. Further, the study of new collective actors representing SE workers, such as MCs, seems useful to understand aspects of organisational and institutional experimentations facing the disruptive tendencies in the labour market (Levesque et al. 2020).

To define the activities these organisations carry out, it may be useful to draw on the well-known concept of ‘capabilities’ introduced by Amartya Sen (1999) and as employed in some analyses of new representational forms (see Westerveld 2012) as representing an opportunity made *actually* possible. We thus distinguish between ‘collective capabilities’ and ‘collective solidarities’. *Collective capabilities* refer to a MC’s capacity to identify aggregating elements among workers that unite them and whose interests do not necessarily belong to the same professional universe or productive sector, nor share the same workplace. This capacity constitutes the basis for inter-professional associational building, rooted in ideas that respond to different logics – ‘instrumental’ and ‘proactive’ – that MCs have developed by leveraging two specific rhetorics:

- a) *a negative rhetoric*, with organisations seeking to ‘fill’ gaps in the protection system, on the one hand, and to counteract the extreme individualisation and atomisation of workers, on the other, making an effort to reconsolidate a collectivity based on professional identities;
- b) *a positive rhetoric* through which organisations not only aggregate SE workers but offer them a collective system in which different professional specialties are respected in their specificity and, in ways that will be

outlined below, provides them with working conditions and protections that are similar to those of traditional, non-precarious work.

Collective solidarities instead refers to the goods and services these organisations offer, services that substantially broaden workers' access to protections for which they would not otherwise be eligible, and strengthens their ability to participate in the market.

We investigate what interests these organisations represent, a question which will allow us to better understand this composite agglomeration of workers and their desires and needs; what strategies they enact; and above all, how they relate to the state. The main purpose of investigating these questions is to assess the prospects of striking a better balance in the future between the risks SE gig workers face and the protections they can enjoy.

Research Methods and Case Study Selection

Our research was conducted at three new worker-representative organisations within the world of mutual aid and cooperatives, and representing numerous SE workers; of these, an ever-growing share are involved in new, as well as traditional, 'gig' jobs. Data was collected between April 2018 and June 2019 through the period of the research via 45 in-depth interviews divided as follows: nine with street-level bureaucrats (SLB); nine with managers of organisations; and 27 with workers hired, enrolled or working in the organisations, (therefore three SLB, three managers, and nine workers per case study). The interviews aim to shed light on three dimensions: internal organisational structures and functions (management level); the rhetorics the organisation uses to communicate with potential members (SLB level); and whether workers' desires and needs are fulfilled, or not, by the organisation, and the associational narratives (factors influencing membership choice) and the respective strong and weak points influencing these narratives.

The three organisations – selected on the basis of their scope of influence and number of members – are Smart in Italy and the Netherlands, and Coopaname in France. Smart is a Belgian Foundation and a European network of cooperatives created in 1998 that represents a wide range of freelancers (artists, creatives, trainers, riders, consultants). The Italian branch has been active since 2014; the Dutch branch since 2016. The former associate almost six thousand workers, the latter two thousand (but there are organisational changes in progress, as we outline below). Both are financially supported by a Belgian parent company; in Italy, the first two years of start-up were also co-financed by the Cariplo Banking Foundation. Coopaname, on the other hand, has been active since 2004. It is an *activité et d'emploi cooperative* set up as a *société coopérative ouvrière de production* (Scop) and financed through national and regional

public funding. It includes almost one thousand workers, located in the Île-de-France area.

In the Italian case, Smart.it is mainly composed of workers in the performing arts sector, such as stage and screen actors; workers who participate in the peripheral labour market are a second group primarily hired for small gigs in events for public and private clients. This membership does not include workers associated with publicly owned theatres or large private events, as these 'dependent' workers still maintain stable professional relationships or work as employees. The Dutch branch of Smart, in contrast, represents digital workers, in particular web designers and web content managers, who freelance and therefore are not eligible for the forms of protection guaranteed by the basic government insurance scheme for subordinate work. The heterogeneity of the French organisation, Coopaname, derives mainly from the fact that it represents both digital workers (in particular web designers, web content managers and musicians) and traditional ones (especially small-scale artisans). We will clarify the reasons for this heterogeneity below when explaining how the state provides financial support to this organisation.

Cooperatives' Logic and Actions

In presenting our main findings, we begin by outlining the associative composition of the three organisations, showing that the Italian and Dutch memberships are highly internally homogeneous while Coopaname is more heterogeneous. The three organisations share the same kinds of mechanisms that make it advantageous for them to represent SE workers and that operate to represent SE workers and for the workers to choose such representation.

From the workers' point of view, as mentioned above, access to a subordinate employment contract has the advantage of making them eligible for forms of protection they could not otherwise access. The organisations can also provide other benefits, in particular in the form of financial planning advice that allows members to identify all possible fiscal deductions they might claim, for instance, and thus reduce their net tax burden. Other benefits may consist of personalised guidance as well as shared projects and initiatives. This guidance is of great benefit, especially for the more vulnerable workers. On the one hand, younger workers cooperate in developing strategies that combine on and off-platform work, and in gaining information on different platforms and their reliability. On the other hand, guidance helps older workers in developing digital skills and navigating the employment market. Workers have pinpointed the 'compass' role of those organisations, in establishing wages benchmarks for one-off and specific gig work, as well as internal systems of ratings of platforms and employers. The information on wages aids the process of professionalisation, especially in new digital sectors where there are no formal skills. The rating system protects workers from 'bad gigs,' and reinforces in MC members

both the sense of belonging and in-group behaviour. From the point of view of the organisations, the economic advantage lies in the fact that they take a share of what their member-workers earn from each job, using these revenues to cover their costs. This share amounts to approximately 10–12% of total revenue and it is important to underline that, currently, it is individual workers who themselves must find work, without help of the MCs, who then deduct their fee from the payments workers receive for each job. It should be added that for organisations that are part of a larger company, support from the parent company is put into a small mutual fund to supplement the wages of member-workers. The result of this arrangement is that the actual capacity of these organisations to carry out mediation in the market is currently limited; therefore, they can be considered primarily service organisations.

However, this is not the only funding these organisations receive. In fact, Smart.it is also supported by contributions from the Belgian parent company, and funding from the Unicredit Banking Foundation. Unlike Coopaname, it does not receive financing from the state. In fact, the French state supports Coopaname with national and regional funding but on the condition that it also represents traditional place-based workers, specifically those located in Île-de-France. It is this condition that explains the heterogeneous nature of Coopaname members and makes it clear that such public support is not aimed exclusively at platform workers, but rather at providing protection and inclusion to more traditional workers. Thanks to Coopaname's activities, however, such coverage is essentially indistinguishable from the kind of protections that it provides to digital gig workers through mutual aid operations. In the Netherlands, the situation is more complex and currently undergoing a process of adjustment. A previous incarnation of the organisation had revealed a problem stemming in part from the characteristics of the social protection system for Dutch workers. Specifically, workers remained SE because the level of contributions the Dutch welfare system required for dependent workers was too high for Smart.NL to cover, effectively preventing the organisation from hiring its members. On one hand, this kept the MC from growing and developing a role of mediation and representation, reducing its operations to services alone. On the other hand, it created lines of division within the 'collective' represented by this MC: discouraging the membership of young freelancers engaged in occasional gig work and interested in retaining their status as independent workers, and encouraging the participation of older workers with stable clients, as a group potentially interested in transforming their status from autonomous to dependent workers. This strategy began in 2017 and gave rise to a selection process aimed at retaining only the 'strongest workers' as organisation members, i.e. workers in a position to afford the high costs of insurance. In the meantime, the MC and the government engaged in negotiations to determine how to implement such coverage. The result of these developments has been to exclude and penalise more short term and temporary freelancers, who are usually also the youngest workers. We will discuss this problem in

more depth in the next section. Here, it is important to note that Smart.NL has responded to this problem by trying to reinforce the professional standing of its member-workers and, together with the state, is carrying out an awareness-raising campaign aimed specifically at improving their professional image and increasing low wages. This would help ensure they have the resources needed to cover the costs of the country's insurance system. Smart.NL's tendency to use the salary levels and the prices it charges for its own services as a criterion for filtering membership of the organisation can be understood in relation to this problem.

The external dimension of the organisation has to do with its ability to relate to other entities and state bodies, in particular lobbying and seeking to exert influence to modify the system governing self-employment benefits, safeguards and practices. Of course, such activity depends in part on the state's stance towards these organisations. An implication of what has been discussed above is that the main differences between the three organisations lies precisely in their relationships with the state. It thus makes sense to lay out some clarifications about these relationships before presenting our conclusions.

State Action and Forms of Institutional Bricolage

It is key that we examine the logics, action strategies and perspectives of these new organisations, including the way they relate to pre-existing institutions, if we are to assess the prospect of limiting precariousness and instability. The state can affect the extent and effectiveness of these organisations' operations in a variety of ways. One of these is, of course, through transfers or (advantageous) taxation. However, the state can also have an impact on the rules and regulations that may either facilitate or hinder the work carried out by these organisations. The results of our study are quite revealing in this respect. In the case of *Italy*, the state appears to be practically absent: it does not interact with Smart.it nor does it provide any type of economic support; instead, as outlined above, such support comes from other sources. This absence is part of a wider pattern of non-intervention by the Italian state in relation to self-employment, traditional or not, and creative work in particular. Indeed, the relative weakness of this professional sector (and especially its digital side) in the labour market probably contributes to obscuring how important it actually is for development. Given this context, an MC has limited room for manoeuvre. As our results clearly show, their activity is almost exclusively aimed at converting gig workers into subordinate workers through employment contracts and finding ways to cover the various costs that this conversion entails.

The *French* case is different and could be described as a model of inclusive, locally based development supported by public funding in that it also includes traditional workers (the small-scale craftspeople mentioned above). Moreover, the state also fosters dialogue between Coopaname and traditional trade

unions, sponsoring joint initiatives whose main objective is to promote inclusion through local employment. The state thus plays a more engaged role in France, and this improves the effectiveness of the MC's work. Turning to the *Dutch* case, Smart.NL can generally be seen as a model of state-led professional consolidation. As outlined above, the state is committed to fostering a shift on multiple levels, including culturally, that would allow digital workers to earn higher wages in the market. This development would apply in particular to web designers. Such a commitment is, of course, commendable in that it aims to redefine work and its legitimacy, while also trying to put a stop to the short term expediencies used to lower labour costs to boost profits and (although this is not always the case) investment in innovative sectors. However, the overall assessment must also take into account that the most vulnerable of the digital workers are facing a series of difficulties that lead them to be excluded from Smart.NL, as previously discussed. These difficulties stem from the high costs of accessing the country's insurance schemes for employees, which this organisation would only be able to cover if the revenues from its activities were greater. This seems to be a weakness, and for the Dutch state to resolve it would require the raising of wages, especially of the most vulnerable, which is not an easy task. The alternative is, of course, to reconsider the requirements for workers' accessing social insurance, considering that the most vulnerable gig workers are not entitled to protection as self-employed workers and cannot obtain such protection by being 'converted' into employees by the MC.

Therefore the intensity of state involvement and the forms it takes varies greatly. Across these diverse cases, institutional bricolage takes the form of an unprecedented hybridisation between two of the MC's functions, with mutual aid principles merged with the principle of public social security. The strategy of transforming SE workers into employees is possible only if access to benefits is a straightforward process, that is, when the threshold of contributions from workers is low as in the Italian and French cases. The requirements in the Dutch case, however, are high enough that this conversion has proved impossible; as a consequence, the MC is pursuing professionalisation and fair wages in order to make it possible.

Conclusions

The few analyses of MCs available to date have focused mainly on their internal organisation and relationships with traditional trade unions (Vandalae 2018). Their relationship with the state, on the other hand, has been investigated very little or not at all. This is a serious shortcoming in light of the results of our research, as described here.

Through a comparative analysis, we have analysed institutional change processes in national gig labour markets (off and on platform). The new challenges involved in ensuring fair working conditions for SE workers are at the centre of

debates in countries throughout Europe (De Stefano 2016). This issue touches on aspects of social inclusion and economic competitiveness, driving us to reflect on just how well economic institutions are able to govern and regulate. It also shines the spotlight on the capacity of democratic actors that are sorely tested by today's more fragmented socio-economic system, as a consequence of risks inside and outside the labour market (Sabel 2001).

The three cases we have investigated show how institutional change mechanisms are triggered in the face of social problems not adequately addressed by previous structures. Change is stimulated when these new actors enter the scene and their functions are redefined in interaction with other actors in the same arena, in particular the state and unions (De Munck and Ferreras 2012). MCs are positioned to perform three main functions: to act as collective actors, to increase employment opportunities, and to stabilise income. They carry out quasi-union activities – that is lobbying and influencing to improve their members' conditions by putting pressure on public actors. They function as agents of 'professionalisation' in that they delimit the boundaries of certain emerging professions, asserting closure regimes to workers in related occupational ecosystems, and promoting fair wages.

However, the main way MCs operate is by working to convert SE workers into subordinate workers, and this approach entails several problems all of which are related to the difficulty of covering costs that such a conversion involves. MCs bring together mutual aid and social security principles in the form of a 'bricolage', and the result is extremely fragile. SE workers can only access limited welfare benefits, as the intermittence of their contracts undermines their ability to pay contributions. Such contributions continue to constitute the main axis along which countries calculate the extent and duration of social protection benefits. In none of the three cases does the state act directly to facilitate this SE-dependent conversion, nor does it seem that the state has actually supported these workers, either by increasing the strength of their position in the market or by improving the protections they are eligible for as self-employed gig (intermittent) workers. Beyond the specificities of the individual case studies, our analysis has shown that mutual aid cooperatives can indeed make a significant contribution to greater labour protection, but such solutions may prove fragile in the absence of other, complementary interventions. In this respect the role of the state could be of paramount importance in many different ways: not only by providing financial aid but also by adapting the design of welfare systems, by bolstering fruitful cooperation among the various actors involved, and by limiting some of the vulnerabilities in the labour market itself.

Recent studies on employment precariousness have underlined the importance of the systemic dimension, showing that the disruptive effects of employment precariousness can be mitigated by generating a 'virtuous circle' with the power to restore solidarity through the participation of workers, employers, unions and 'inclusive' institutions; they also show that the effects of

precariousness can be exacerbated by fragmented and particularistic actors and institutions (see Doellgast, Lillie and Pulignano 2018 regarding this virtuous vs. vicious theoretical framework). Although our research did uncover interesting strategies for combating job insecurity, the analysis shows that attempts to prevent such conditions are still fragmented and fragile: a case in point is the regulatory framework itself, with its neglect of a group of workers that is increasingly important in Europe. This neglect could be framed as a democratic issue rather than a capitalistic one (Iversen and Soskice 2019).

Note

- ¹ MCs are relevant actors in the arena of self-employed workers and freelancers (Murgia and de Heusch 2020).

References

- Bellini A. and Lucciarini, S. 2019. Not Only Riders. The Uncertain Boundaries of Digital Creative Work as a Frontier for Emerging Actors in Interest Representation. *Partecipazione e Conflitto*, 12(3), 845–870.
- Brynjolfsson, E. and McAfee, A. 2011. *Race Against the Machine: How the Digital Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy*. Digital Frontier Press.
- Calhoun, C. 2013. What Threatens Capitalism Now? In I. Wallerstein, R. Collins, M. Mann, G. Derluigan, and C. Calhoun (Eds.), *Does Capitalism Have a Future?* (pp. 131–162). Oxford University Press.
- Carstensen, M. 2015. Bricolage as an Analytical Lens in New Institutionalism. In F. Panizza and T. Spanakos (Eds.), *Conceptual Comparative Politics* (pp. 46–67). Routledge.
- Carstensen, M. 2017. Institutional Bricolage in Times of Crisis. *European Political Science Review*, 9(1), 139–160.
- Cleaver, F. 2012. *Development Through Bricolage: Rethinking Institutions for Natural Resource Management*. Routledge.
- Cleaver, F. and de Koning, J. 2015. Furthering Critical Institutionalism. *International Journal of the Commons*, 9(1), 1–18.
- Conen, W. and Schippers, J. 2020. *Self-Employment as Precarious Work: A European Perspective*. Edward Elgar.
- Crouch, C. 1999. *Social Change in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press
- Daskalova, V. I. 2018. Regulating the New Self-Employed in the Uber Economy: What Role for EU Competition Law? *German Law Journal*, 19(3), 461–508.
- Davidson, S. and Potts, J. 2016. The Social Costs of Innovation Policy. *Economic Affairs*, 36(3), 282–293.

- De Stefano, V. 2016. *The Rise of the 'Just-In-Time' Workforce: On-Demand Work, Crowd Work And Labour Protection In The 'Gig-Economy'*. ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series no. 7. International Labour Office.
- De Munck, J. and Ferreras, I. 2012. The Democratic Exchange as the Combination of Deliberation Bargaining and Experimentation. In J. De Munck, C. Didry, I. Ferreras and A. Jobert (Eds.), *Renewing Democratic Deliberation in Europe: The Challenge of Social and Civil Dialogue* (pp. 149–169). Peter Lang.
- Doellgast V., Lillie, N., and Pulignano, V. 2018. *Reconstructing Solidarity: Labour Unions, Precarious Work, and the Politics of Institutional Change in Europe*. Oxford University Press.
- Eurofound. 2017a. *Exploring Self-Employment in the European Union*. Office of the European Union.
- Eurofound. 2017b. *Classifying Self-Employment and Creating an Empirical Typology*. Office of the European Union.
- European Commission. 2018. Platform Workers in Europe: Evidence from the COLLEEM Survey, EUR 29275 EN, Luxembourg.
- Gallie, D. 2013. *Economic Crisis, Quality of Work, and Social Integration: The European Experience*. Oxford University Press.
- Grimshaw, D., Johnson, M., Keizer, A., and Rubery, J. 2016. *Reducing Precarious Work in Europe Through Social Dialogue: The Case of the UK*. Project Report for the European Commission, European Work and Employment Research Centre, University of Manchester.
- Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. (Eds.), 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press.
- Hyman, R. and Gumbrell-McCormick, R. 2017. Resisting Labour Market Insecurity: Old and New Actors, Rivals or Allies? *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 59(4), 538–561.
- ILO. 2015. Non-standard forms of employment – Report for discussion at the Meeting of Experts on Non-Standard Forms of Employment (Geneva, 16–19 February 2015). International Labour Organization.
- Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. 2019. *Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century*. Princeton University Press.
- Kalleberg, A. 2011. *Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of Polarized and Precarious Employment Systems in the United States, 1970s–2000s*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Levesque, C., Murray, G., and Morgan, G. 2020. Disruption and Re-Regulation in Work and Employment: From Organisational to Institutional Experimentation. *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 26(2), 135–156.
- Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (Eds.), 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge University Press.
- Murgia, A. and de Heusch, S. 2020. It Started with the Artists and Now it Concerns Everyone: The Case of Smart, a Cooperative of 'Salaried Autonomous

- Workers'. In S. Taylor and S. Luckman (Eds.), *Pathways into Creative Working Lives*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- OECD. 2019. Employment Outlook 2019: The Future of Work. Retrieved from: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2019_9ee00155-en (last accessed 22 June 2021).
- Ostrom, E. 1990. *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press.
- Peck, J. and Theodore, N. 2007. Variegated Capitalism. *Progress in Human Geography*, 31(6), 731–772.
- Pernicka, S. 2006. Organizing the Self-Employed: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 12(2), 125–42.
- Sabel, C. F. 2001. A Quiet Revolution of Democratic Governance: Towards Democratic Experimentalism. In *OECD Governance in the 21st Century* (pp. 121–148). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- Sen, A. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford University Press.
- Streeck, W. 2011. Taking Capitalism Seriously: Towards an Institutional Approach to Contemporary Political Economy. *Socio-Economic Review*, 9(1), 137–167.
- Streeck, W. and Thelen, K., (Eds.), 2005. *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*. Oxford University Press.
- Vandaele, K. 2018. Will Trade Unions Survive in the Platform Economy? Emerging Patterns of Platform Workers' Collective Voice and Representation in Europe. ETUI Research Paper – Working Paper 2018.05. Retrieved from SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198546> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3198546> (last accessed June 22, 2021).
- Westerveld, M. 2012. The 'New' Self-Employed: An Issue for Social Policy? *European Journal of Social Security*, 14(3), 156–173.